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On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion 
Case
William Simkulet
University of Wisconsin - Marshﬁ eld/Wood County
Abstract: In his recent article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,” 
Pereboom (2008) presents what he calls the “Tax Evasion” case, a 
Frankfurt-style case designed to show the falsity of the principle of 
alternate possibilities (PAP).  According to Pereboom, PAP requires robust 
alternate possibilities such that an agent could have acted in a manner 
in which she knew she would have lacked moral responsibility for her 
actions.  However, according to his “Tax Evasion” case, the tax evader 
lacks such robust alternate possibilities, and yet is still uncontroversially 
morally responsible for his actions.  Here I argue Pereboom’s account of 
robust alternate possibilities is deﬁ cient, offer a more intuitively plausible 
account of robust alternate possibilities, and argue that Pereboom’s tax 
evasion case fails to cut off morally relevant alternate possibilities.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry Frankfurt 
(1969) presents an infamous case designed to be a counterexample to 
the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). According to PAP moral 
responsibility requires the ability to have done otherwise—To be morally 
responsible for some action x, you must have been able to do something 
other than x. 
In a Frankfurt-style case an agent is said to lack alternate possibilities, 
yet be uncontroversially morally culpable for her actions.  Critics of 
Frankfurt argue that such cases fail to prove the falsity of PAP—either 
such cases fail to cut off alternate possibilities, or the agents involved 
aren’t uncontroversially morally responsible for acting (see Kane, 1985; 
1996; Widerker, 1995; Ginet, 1996; and Goetz, 2005).
Pereboom argues that PAP requires more than just alternate 
possibilities—it requires robust alternate possibilities, and constructs a 
case in which he believes an agent is uncontroversially morally responsible 
despite lacking this kind of alternate possibilities (see Pereboom, 2005; 
2008).  In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s account of robust alternate 
possibilities is at odds with our moral intuitions, propose an alternate 
account of robustness, and then argue his case fails to cut off this relevant 
form of alternate possibilities.
Frankfurt-style cases are attempts to demonstrate the falsity of PAP 
by showing that an agent can be uncontroversially morally responsible 
despite lacking the ability to do otherwise.1  Unfortunately for proponents 
of such cases, they fail.  Critics have successfully shown that in these cases 
either the case-designer needs to assume universal causal determinism, 
which undermines our moral intuitions about the guilt of the agent, or it 
fails to cut off alternate possibilities.2
John Martin Fischer contends that although Frankfurt cases fail to 
cut off all alternate possibilities, the available alternate possibilities are 
“insufﬁ ciently robust to ground our attributions of moral responsibility” 
(1999, p. 210).  Pereboom offers the following account of robustness:
Robustness (2): For an alternative possibility to be relevant to 
explaining why an agent is morally responsible for an action 
it must satisfy the following characterization: she could have 
willed something different from what she actually willed 
such that she understood that by willing it she would be, or at 
least would likely to be, precluded from the responsibility she 
actually has. (2008, pp. 7-8)
To have had robust alternate possibilities, according to Pereboom, is to 
have been such that (i) you could have acted other than you actually acted 
and (ii) had you acted in this fashion, you would have been differently 
morally responsible.  Pereboom’s account does not, however, require 
that one have had the opportunity to be entirely precluded from moral 
responsibility, rather he only requires that one had the opportunity to be 
responsible for a different thing.  Strictly speaking, Pereboom’s account 
of robust alternate possibilities is consistent with all of an agent’s possible 
actions being such that she would be blameworthy for choosing any of 
them.  However, this account is seriously at odds with our commonsense 
moral intuitions.
A more charitable reading of Pereboom’s account of robustness 
includes a third criteria—Avoidability of moral responsibility.  This 
account of robustness is best read as derived from Michael Otsuka’s 
principle of avoidable blame.  In “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability 
of Blame,” Otsuka (1998) constructs an alternate principle to PAP—the 
principle of avoidable blame (PAB), according to which for an agent to 
be morally blameworthy for her actions, she must have been able to act 
in a manner in which she would have been entirely morally blameless. 
This is not to say that had she acted differently she would be entirely 
precluded from moral responsibility; rather her alternate actions might 
have been praiseworthy, or at least morally acceptable.3  Like PAP, PAB 
requires alternate possibilities, only more narrowly construed.  Shortly 
after unveiling his original account of robustness in “Defending Hard 
Incompatibilism,” Pereboom (2005) cites Otsuka, so it is safe to assume 
he had Otsuka’s principle in mind.4
According to PAB, to be blameworthy one must be able to act in 
a manner in which one is entirely blameless, not entirely deﬁ cient of 
moral responsibility.  We can construct a similar principle concerning 
praiseworthiness—what I call the principle of avoidable praise or acclaim 
(PAA, for abbreviation clarity), according to which praiseworthiness 
requires that one have the ability to act in a manner in which one entirely 
morally praiseless.  (Such an action may be blameworthy or merely 
acceptable, but not worthy of praise.)  Pereboom is best understood as 
having the following account of robustness:
An alternate possibility is robust if and only if the action 
satisﬁ es the following characterization: If the agent is 
blameworthy, she must have had the ability to act in a 
manner in which she would be entirely morally praiseless.  
If the agent is praiseworthy, she must have had the ability 
to act in a manner in which she would be entirely morally 
blameless.
The problem here is that Pereboom has effectively substituted PAB (and 
PAA) for PAP, a much less robust principle.  While both PAB and PAA are 
intuitively compelling, they are perhaps a bit too speciﬁ c for Frankfurt-
style cases, which are designed to demonstrate the falsity of any reasonable 
account of PAP.  As such, I think the following account of robustness is an 
appropriate target for Frankfurt-style cases:
An agent has a robust alternate possibilities if and only if 
she could have acted in a manner in which she believes5 
she would have been differently morally responsible.
This account of robustness is consistent with Fischer’s criticism that a 
twitch doesn’t satisfy a sufﬁ ciently robust alternate possibility, but is also 
consistent with Otsuka’s assertion that persons in traditional Frankfurt-
style cases have avoidable blame.  As such, if Pereboom’s case can show 
an agent lacks robust alternate possibilities of this kind, he will have 
successfully demonstrated the falsity of PAP, PAB, and PAA.
Here is a concise version of Pereboom’s “Tax Evasion” case:
Joe has good reason to believe that he can get away with 
cheating on his taxes, but believes it is wrong to do so.  His 
strong desire to advance his own self interest will causally 
determine Joe to cheat on his taxes at time t1, unless he exercises 
his libertarian free will to choose otherwise.  Joe cannot change 
his mind on a whim.
In order to exercise his libertarian free will, Joe must ﬁ rst 
reach a certain level of attentiveness to moral reasons, and Joe 
can do so voluntarily.  However, even if he reaches this level 
of attentiveness, and exercises his libertarian free will, his 
libertarian free will can result in him choosing either to pay his 
taxes in full, or to cheat on his taxes.
A neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to Joe, implanted 
a device in his brain which is triggered by him reaching the 
appropriate level of moral attentiveness.  When triggered, 
the device robs him of his libertarian free will and causally 
determines him to cheat on his taxes.  As it so happens, Joe 
never raises his moral attentiveness level “and he chooses 
to evade taxes on his own, while the device remains idle.” 
(Pereboom, 2008, pp. 9-10)
Pereboom contends that (A) Joe lacks robust alternate possibilities, and 
yet (B) he is uncontroversially morally responsible for cheating on his 
taxes.  Either (A) or (B) is false.
Perhaps the most glaring issue with the tax evasion case is the utterly 
bizarre decision making process Pereboom saddles Joe with.  Joe can’t 
act on a whim—for example, he can’t wake up one night and, on a whim, 
choose to complete his taxes.  Rather, the only way for Joe to do what he 
believes is morally correct is to ﬁ rst jump through the hoop of “raising 
his moral attentiveness level,” and only after doing this does he have the 
ability to exercise his libertarian free will regarding his choice to pay his 
taxes.
Joe is nothing like we think we are.  We believe that we can act on a 
whim (whether this belief is justiﬁ ed is outside the scope of this paper), 
and thus it’s not at all clear that we can trust our moral intuitions about 
this case even if we’re inclined to agree that Joe is morally culpable for 
cheating on his taxes in this case.
However, let us assume that if Joe raised his moral attentiveness 
level, and had there been no device to circumvent his libertarian free will, 
then Joe would have been uncontroversially morally responsible for his 
actions.  Now let us turn our attention to the steps that Joe must engage in 
to make a free choice about his taxes—according to Pereboom, Joe must 
ﬁ rst voluntarily raise his moral attentiveness level.  How does this occur? 
There are several possibilities.  His raising his moral attentiveness level 
might be (i) completely causally determined by circumstances outside of 
his control, (ii) causally determined by an indeterministic decision making 
method outside of his control, or (iii) causally determined by his libertarian 
free will.  If (i) or (ii), then according to most of us it doesn’t make sense 
to hold Joe morally accountable for cheating on his taxes because there 
was nothing he could do to avoid this, and thus (B) would be false—Joe 
is not uncontroversially morally responsible for his actions.6  In fact, quite 
the opposite, Joe is uncontroversially not responsible for what he is forced 
to do.
Suppose, though, that raising his moral attentiveness level was a 
matter of his exercising his libertarian free will—either (iiia) Joe was 
aware of reasons he ought to utilize his libertarian free will to raise his 
moral attentiveness level, or (iiib) he wasn’t.  Joe’s decision making 
process is prima facie unlike ours, and it’s not at all clear that Joe is aware 
of how his decision making process works.  If (iiib) then he doesn’t know 
that a prerequisite for choosing to pay his taxes is to ﬁ rst raise his moral 
attentiveness level and it doesn’t make sense to blame him for failing to 
do something he didn’t have any reason to do—again (B) would be false.
However, if (iiia), then Joe believes that a necessary, but not sufﬁ cient, 
step for his choosing not to cheat on his taxes is for him to ﬁ rst utilize his 
libertarian free will to raise his moral attentiveness level.  By failing to use 
his libertarian free will to raise his moral attentiveness level, he is setting 
himself up for future moral failure.  If one has a moral obligation to do x, 
then one has a moral obligation to do all the steps necessary to achieve x. 
When Joe fails to raise his attentiveness, he fails to do a step necessary to 
achieve his obligation to pay his taxes, and as such he is uncontroversially 
blameworthy for this failure independently of whether or not he could 
have chosen to cheat on his taxes later on.  If (iiia), then Joe had robust 
alternate possibilities because he could have acted in a way in which he 
believed he would have been differently morally responsibly.  This is to 
say that (A) is false.
In summation, Pereboom contends that Joe lacks robust alternate 
possibilities, and yet he is uncontroversially morally responsible for 
choosing to cheat on his taxes.  Pereboom stipulates that a necessary, 
but not sufﬁ cient, condition for Joe to pay his taxes is that he must ﬁ rst 
do something else—raise his moral attentiveness level (whatever this 
is).  Either it is in Joe’s control to do this, or it is not.  If it’s not within 
Joe’s control, intuitively he’s not morally responsible for failing to do so 
or summarily being causally determined to cheat on his taxes as result. 
Suppose, though, that it is within Joe’s control to raise his attentiveness, 
and furthermore that Joe knows that raising his attentiveness is a necessary 
step to doing the right thing.  If this were the case, then Joe can either freely 
choose to raise his attentiveness level or not.  If Joe has a moral obligation 
to pay his taxes, then he has a moral obligation to do everything necessary 
to pay his taxes.  Thus, Joe can either satisfy his moral obligation to raise 
his attentiveness level and be prima facie praiseworthy for doing so, or 
fail to do so and be prima facie blameworthy; but this just is to say that 
Joe has robust alternate possibilities—Joe can act in a manner in which he 
believes he will be differently morally responsible than if he fails to act in 
that manner.
 
Notes
1 See Frankfurt (1969), Mele and Robb (1998), and Fischer (2010) for 
traditional Frankfurt-style cases designed to show the agent lacks any alternate 
possibilities.
2 Recently Harry Frankfurt has taken the position that his original case 
doesn’t cut off alternate possibilities, but supposedly shows that alternate 
possibilities play no role in determining the agent’s responsibility—see Frankfurt 
(2003/2006).
3 It is outside the scope of this paper whether it is possible to be morally 
responsible, but neither praiseworthy or blameworthy, or what this would be like, 
but if such a state is possible, it would satisfy the alternate possibilities required 
by PAB.
4 Pereboom’s ﬁ rst account of robustness can be found in his (2005, p. 232), 
and cites Otsuka three pages later.
5 There is room to debate whether this belief needs to be justiﬁ ed, or whether 
strong but irrational belief is sufﬁ cient, but this discussion is outside the scope of 
this paper.
6 At least there’s nothing Joe can do during the events described in the case, 
he might be morally responsible for coming to have a selﬁ sh character, or for 
having previously freely chosen to cheat on his taxes.
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